My Op-Ed on China

The phenomenal economic growth in China for the past few decades has awed the world. Its consistency and resilience has made many analysts to forecast that its current growth trajectory is expected to continue. Proper management of this new found economic strength via good governance will enable it to perpetuate itself and increase economic, military and inevitably political power.

Although a detailed study of China’s growth in the economic, social, environmental and political dimensions reveal that there are potential speed bumps, a casual analysis would perceptively conclude that China is indeed rising by relative comparisons over time and is attempting to fulfill its stated objective of becoming a da guo (大国 – great power). Using a traditional realist lens, this rapid change of power dynamics would lead to a change in the balance of power not only for the region but between China, a rising power and the United States, the de facto superpower of the world today. This potential instability from China’s rise is therefore a motivation for us to examine these interactions closely so that we may understand potential areas of friction and perhaps generate appropriate recommendations for policy makers to avert a violent conflict.

Understanding China

China has a deep desire to be a daguo since the time of Sun Yat-sen, and this desire has been spurred by the many years of humiliation that they suffer from the foreign powers that took advantage of the weak Qing dynasty in late 1800s. While the rest of the world marched toward modernity from World War II, the Chinese were caught in a civil war between the Nationalist and the Communist. Although the eventual Communist victory brought stability to the nation, it was trapped in the ideological contest during the Cold War and remained isolated from the world. It was only during Deng Xiaoping’s time, that China was able to reverse its policies and put China on track for economic expansion and growth.

With economic growth, comes the associated cost of interdependence and the need to co-operate and build trust. The Chinese leadership understands this security dilemma and has been careful not to derail their valued economic growth through any perceived aggressive actions. Deng Xiaoping’s warning of bu yao dang tou (不要当头 - do not seek leadership) exhorts self-restraint and humility while the more recent and proactive policies of fuzeren de daguo (负责任的大国 – responsible great power) advocated by Jiang Zemin demonstrates China’s understanding of its interdependent relationship with the rest of the world. These are important markers of their intent based on explicit principles that we know China has a propensity to rigidly adhere to.

China’s interactions with Asia

Regardless of the historical perspective of the Middle Kingdom or the articulated grand strategy by the Chinese leadership today, they share a commonality. That is the desire to be a great nation that is built on a strong economic base, so that it may derive respect and acknowledgment from its periphery. China’s policy of non-intervention in sovereignty of states and her purely economic engagements for mutual benefits, has won it many friends in Asia and beyond, but at times drawn flak from United States and other Western powers for its mercantilist approach that often turns a blind eye to issues of human rights and potential security threats.

In Asia, it has engaged in many regional arrangements which includes ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), ACFTA (ASEAN China-Free Trade Area), TAC (Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia), ASEAN + 3 (ASEAN + China, Japan and South Korea), SCO (Shanghai Co-operation Engagement) and other bilateral agreements. These are significant confidence building measures that builds on the premise of their increasing mutual economic interdependence that will potentially extend to forge a regional security arrangement that will add to the stability of the region. China has also renounced the use of force on the issue of the Spratlys in the TAC, playing a backseat role as a demonstration of goodwill to Southeast Asian countries. The net effect of Chinese actions is the shared belief of the region to integrate China to the international community and to accommodate China’s rise, while at the same time tapping on China as an engine for their economic growth.

The Deal Breaker

The lynchpin of the stability in Asia is undeniably the tumultuous relationship between China and Taiwan. This is the single issue that China will neither relent nor compromise on and is willing to stake its relationship with other nations on. We need to recognize that any compromise on this issue will negate China’s position as a da guo, and reopen old wounds of humiliation that it is trying to heal. China will therefore continue to engage a multi-prong strategy of exerting its soft power to gain legitimacy of her claim over Taiwan and at the concurrently use her economic weight to bend Taiwan’s will to seek independence. As a last resort, the use of force will serve as deterrence and physical coercion that will be applied should Taiwan decidedly declares independence.

The US – China Equation

The issues of Taiwan will be the key determinant of Sino-American relations in the years to come. The contest between U.S. ideology and Chinese pride will continue to persist unless one party is willing to back down to de-escalate the situation and break the stalemate. This issue had persisted in times when China was weak and is even more unlikely to change now that it has grown in strength. Because China’s rise is now evident, the only recourse is for U.S. to strategically accommodate China’s key interest and to engage her need in meeting the world’s expectation of her to be a responsible power. It would be unlikely that both nations would desire to escalate the situation to the point of war unless there is a failure of institutions and leadership on both sides that believes some benefit can be derived from a violent conflict. U.S. suspicion of China’s rise and their stalemate involving Taiwan will invariably lead to more persistent and intense conflicts. Past conflicts of the Taiwan Straits incident in 1995-96, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the U.S. spy plane incidents and the recent Chinese reaction to US sale of weapons to Taiwan are examples of what we can expect over the next decade. These conflicts will unlikely lead to violent conflict and will more likely result in the maintenance of a fragile status quo.