China : Discovering the Ascendant Dragon and its Conquest of the Sea
In the past few decades, the world has been enthralled by the economic miracle of China. Deng Xiaopeng’s “Four Modernizations” plan has transformed the formerly communist-nation, crippled by a brutal Cultural Revolution, into an economic heavyweight.[1] By adopting Western pillars of success, it is believed that China, together with India, will embark on a march to modernity and herald a shift to a “new Asian hemisphere”.[2] There is, however, no guarantee for this future by sheer extrapolation alone, as history has proven that China’s continental focus and failure to embrace an oceanic perspective can derail its dominance. Like the mythological dragons in Chinese folklore that were the lords of the sea, the oceans have a symbiotic relationship with this ancient civilization.
The human ability to navigate across vast oceans was the historical turning point that marked the beginning of an evolutionary trend of economic globalization.[3] Movement of resources and finished goods over the seas remains the modus operandi and the most cost effective means of transportation. The ability to maintain access to the seas is therefore as important as the creativity and the quality expressed in the production of economic goods. The acquisition of naval assets to defend the sea lines of communication would quite naturally be a logical inference of gaining sea power. Although the might of the navy is crucial, I hesitate to adopt a Mahanian perspective on sea power but rather select a broader definition of modern sea power that includes the nation state’s capacity for international commerce and utilization of oceanic resources.[4] To determine and predict China’s future will involve a systematic study of her modern sea power, which can evolve as a result of the form of deliberate strategic decisions undertaken by the Chinese government or by non-deliberate externalities of international interactions and development.
The first element of Chinese modern sea power is cohesiveness of the ethnic identity that transcends international borders.[5] The seed of Chinese economic growth was the involuntary dispersion and creation of the Chinese Diaspora. These overseas Chinese scattered themselves by sea during the era of colonial expansion and civil strife in an attempt to seek out a better life. Many found themselves taking root in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore and in smaller pockets, would establish “Chinatowns” throughout the world. They lay in wait, establishing themselves in the open economy outside China, taking over the role of adopting an oceanic orientation even when the state failed to do so. Deng Xiaoping’s official visit to Singapore in 1979, marked a historical turning point that reaffirmed his decision to bringing forth economic liberalization to turn China around.[6] In the years that followed, Gomez and Xiao argued that it was the overseas Chinese that created a form of ethnic capital that served as the spark that assisted in kick-starting the Chinese enterprise.[7] Japan and the four “Little Dragons” of Asia therefore paved the way and nursed the growth and emergence of the Chinese Dragon. This is by far the strongest and most powerful expression of Chinese oceanic orientation and modern sea power.
A community of individuals that exists outside of the state however, remains as a catalyst and cannot compare to the role of nation state itself. Unless the state agency has the same unction to continue to use the sea as an avenue, there will be no process to catalyze. An analysis of whether the Chinese grand strategy embodies a saltwater perspective will be critical in the assessment of its rise. Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, capture the essence of China’s grand strategy as the need “to secure and shape a security, economic, and political environment that is conducive to China concentrating on its economic, social, and political development.”[8] Although this policy sounds extremely outward looking, China’s security concept since the Ming dynasty in the 1300s has always differed greatly from Europe’s international system that featured intensive-military competition and global expansion.[9] The Chinese tributary political system compared to the Western colonial model is wholly regional and preoccupied with the periphery. Coupled with a domestic focus, China seems to be trapped by a perennial continental outlook.
There is a silver lining within China’s articulated grand strategy that may influence and force the leadership to look beyond the regionalism. The pursuit of economic liberalization created an ideological vacuum by voiding communism. This political and ideological vacuum was quickly filled by pragmatic nationalism that was necessary for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to remain relevant and legitimate.[10] This forced the CCP to place continual economic growth and national prestige as priorities that would demand more than a regional orientation. Aggressive efforts to secure natural resources such as oil and gas and other factors of productions critical for economic growth necessitate global interactions. It is important to note that despite need to globalize, there is no change to the Chinese political model and principle of non-intervention that underscored by the Chinese concept of world governance.[11]
Apart from deciphering and making assumptions of Chinese strategic intent and other non-state forms of Chinese oceanic orientation, the real litmus test of Chinese maritime orientation would be the explicit manifestations of characteristics that typify successful maritime nations. We can draw from pertinent lessons of successful modern maritime nations like Japan, Korea and Singapore, and historical maritime states like Venice, the Dutch and the British.
The phenomenal modern day economic miracles of Japan, Korea and Singapore’s export economies can be narrowed to a few common denominators. The first is the availability of human capital that can be deployed and applied to production of goods for an export economy, enabling countries to tap a much larger market beyond what their own market can offer. Although China has a large population and territory, these merely convey the implied potential market that it can have because the majority of its population is still stricken with poverty. It therefore needed to export and attract foreign investments to raise subsistence levels and create a credible middle class. Although Chinese labor did not possess the discipline of the Japanese, nor the education and skill level of the Korean and Singaporeans,[12] what it lacked for quality, it more than made up for in quantity. These non-unionized rural workers flocked to Chinese coastal cities and industrial towns in search of economic freedom, creating an availability of cheap and hardworking labor that enabled late-stage “industrial revolution”, propelling China to become the factory of the world. This turned China into an export economy that saw the Chinese share of global trade grow ten-fold, surpassing Japan to become the world’s third largest trading economy in 2004, given that its economy was only two-fifths of the size of Japan’s.[13] The abandonment of the Maoist ideal of national self-sufficiency and participation in global trade enabled China to reap exponential growth.[14]
The second commonality that China has with the modern day maritime nations of Japan, Korea and Singapore, is the development of the shipbuilding industry and its affiliates. To power an export economy, a country needs a robust shipbuilding industry to create a merchant fleet to transport and carry shipments of raw materials and goods. The availability of raw material is also quintessential to the ship construction industry that demands large quantities of steels. Korea has POSCO, a large steel manufacturer to drives its shipbuilding industry, while the Chinese government does the same by creating several state-own equivalents. In 2004, just when Korea surpassed Japan as the largest shipbuilder, it already found China over its shoulder with an ambitious target to supersede Korean production by 2015.[15] This inherent shipbuilding capability also provides two other peripherals functions; the ability to rapidly conduct naval military expansion and the ability to produce vessels for offshore exploitation of natural resources. In any case, this expansion of China’s shipbuilding capability is a clear indication of Chinese maritime orientation.
The final attribute that China has in common with Japan, Korea and Singapore is their current geopolitical relevance. China found itself surrounded by the booming economies of Asia in the 1980s, and found itself to be a perfect fit in the production supply chain. As the Asian economies moved up the value chain to produce high tech products, China cornered the assembly market that was labor intensive, requiring a factor of production that it abundance and was relatively cheaper than the other Asian economies. It a perfect union in which the Asian economies are vertically integrated creating a “virtual” regional production line, with each nation specializing in its own niche areas that complement one another.
Apart from a securing a niche within the production chain, the next criterion for any successful enterprise is the availability of the markets to sell the finished products. Historically, the world has long been fascinated by what China has to offer. In the past, the Europeans travelled halfway around the world, buying valuable Chinese tea and silk by transporting them in sail ships. Today, the United States is the biggest export market and the largest consumer for what China has to offer and yet has a closer proximity and faster and greater load bearing ships that before. The ample ports cities of China accounted for 12 percent of global trade in 2005 when it was only 4 percent five years before.[16]
Maritime nations of the past like Venice, Dutch and British offer a different perspective on the utilization of the sea as an avenue and foundation of becoming a successful maritime state. Venetian maritime orientation had a profound effect on its political system creating a hybridization of a monarchy, aristocracy in the Senate, and democracy in the Major Council, that established a ‘classical’ republic. China with the opening of its borders to trade has also subjected itself to potential cultural and ideological influences from the outside world. Although it remains authoritarian via a one party rule, it has a form of participatory democracy at the local level,[17] a meritocratic promotion system within the party and a form of ‘inner-party democracy’[18] much like the modernized version of the imperial examination system. Rather than subjecting itself to the popular notions of governance for the period, Venice and China utilized their exposure to the world to customize a system that works best to drive the state forward, capturing the best elements of different methods of governance and working them to their advantage. Last but not least, the Chinese are believers in the utility and art of diplomacy that the Venetians pioneered. Chinese diplomacy is expressed in the Confucian and Mencian Paradigms, in which use of force is largely unnecessary[19], and at the same time is made prominent in the West’s preoccupation with Chinese ‘soft power.’[20]
The root of soft power is economic success and wealth. In this respect, the Chinese are extremely similar to the Dutch, whose success was based on their ability to delink economical objectives from the social and political objectives, amassing information and huge amounts of capital. A key factor of China’s rapid growth has been the high level of saving and investments[21], which is contrary to ailing growth trajectory in the United States which is based on consumerism that created a negative savings rate. The uncanny similarity of Dutch and Chinese mercantilist nature is also worthy of note. The Dutch were neither missionaries nor explorers and were purely profit-maximizing merchants; smilarly the Mammon worshipping Chinese are renowned as shrewd merchants who deal purely for profit without exporting ideology, abiding by a strict policy of non-intervention with other states. The Chinese military like the Dutch Fleet is subservient to the civilian realm and serves merely to protect its right and ability to trade and conduct business. It was the combination of their economic orientation and ability to use the seas that made both these nations great.
In the 1600s, the consolidation of the monarchical powers of the Tudors in the English Court, spurred Britain’s pelagic orientation. The fiscal efficiency of the Tudor court together with their ability to mimic the Dutch, mirrored the one party power of the Chinese government and their ability to adapted best practices from other successful nations. Just as a romantic Navalism replaced Catholicism after the British fleet’s victory over the Spanish Armada in 1588, the Chinese use the triumphant narratives of Zheng He’s expeditions to coincide with China’s coming of age into world stage, replacing the fallen ideology of communism.
Despite many indications that demonstrate China’s realignment to become a pelagic state, there are however many impediments that shackle the ascendant dragon. Some of these factors are within Chinese control, while others are the response of nations that may fear its growing power and influence. Ironically, a China that looks to the sea finds that the ocean is the source of its strength and yet it is also its bane, since it triggers irrational fear of it impending might and creates a potential band of dragon slayers. There is good reason therefore to avoid the most obvious forms of acquiring modern sea power.
Internally within China, corruption and the “to get rich is glorious” mantra is the kryptonite that will weaken and potentially destroy this rising superpower. A Chinese official estimate for corruption-related losses of state revenue is at about 4 percent of GDP annually while corruption capital flight is 2 percent of GDP[22] . This figure may potentially be higher which could mean that capital flight far exceeds the capital inflows that China can attract. In addition, unscrupulous businessmen sometimes seek money saving-shortcuts when producing Chinese goods, resulting in hazardous products and numerous food scares. These are the side effects from the “to get rich is glorious” mantra that will potentially stall China’s economic liberalization and destroy China’s “branding”. Like every maritime nation that once had a glorious past, negligence and lack of prudence can quickly lead to irreversible decline.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of China’s possible orientation to a maritime power is the question of naval power. Frequently, China experts and analysts will use any sign of Beijing’s plans for naval expansion as an early indicator of Chinese maritime orientation. This is contentious due to the multi-faceted nature of modern sea power as defined in this paper. An open and expressed desire to conduct naval expansion would be perceived as a challenge and contest for naval supremacy with the incumbent naval power, the United States. This would be an extremely foolhardy move to challenge the status quo and to provoke a more cautionary and hostile reaction from the U.S. upon whom China is still reliant. In my assessment, the more pragmatic approach that the Chinese leadership choose to undertake would be to employ a similar strategy that was used by the Japanese, aligning in no specific terms with United States, gaining protection from their security umbrella and focusing all of its efforts on building prosperity.[23] At this juncture, Chinese naval forces are ample and sufficient for its regional interests and more than adequate for China to deal with any regional threats.
Political observers who use China’s naval expansion as the sole determinant of its increasing maritime power would miss the mark. China’s adoption of a saltwater perspective consists of aspects beyond the obvious sources of strength. The methodology adopted by naval historians in analysing maritime nations of the past will therefore prove to be more successful. The ultimate strategic purpose of the sea is to obtain resources, facilitate access and grow beyond the territorial confines of a nation’s borders. In addition, fiscal prudence and a steady, incremental approach to laying a strong national foundation while maintaining a delicate balance with external powers are the keys to a successful maritime nation. Chinese core political concepts such as “bu yao tang tou” (不要当头- do not seek leadership) articulated by Deng[24] and maintained by his successors, are not indicative of a inward looking China but rather a pragmatic and emerging sea power trying to prevent imperial overstretch. This is a form of diplomatic prudence is to create room for China to continue its non-military maritime expansion and to build a strong economic base. Only when we have an understanding of this pragmatic and alternative notion of modern maritime sea power, will we be truly able to understand the ascendant dragon.
Bibliography
Bergsten, C. F. China: The Balance Sheet: what the World Needs to Know Now about the Emerging Superpower. PublicAffairs, 2006.
Brooke, James. “Korea reigns in shipbuilding, for now.” The International Herald Tribune. http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/01/05/business/ships.php.
Cohen, W. I. East Asia at the Center: Four Thousand Years of Engagement with the World. Columbia University Press, 2001.
Goh, Kong Yong. “Is China Predisposed to Using Force? Confucian-Mencian and Sunzi Paradigms in Chinese Strategic Culture.” Pointer - Journal of Singapore Armed Forces 25, no. 4 (1999). http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25_4/16.htm.
Gomez, E. T., and X. Xiao. Chinese Enterprise, Transnationalism, and Identity. Routledge, 2004.
Hawkins, W. R. How China Plans to Dominate the Shipbuilding Industry. August, 2001.
Kang, D. C. “Hierarchy in Asian International Relations: 1300-1900.” Asian Security 1, no. 1 (2005): 53-79.
Kurlantzick, J. Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World. Yale University Press, 2007.
Mahbubani, K. The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East. PublicAffairs, 2008.
Shambaugh, D. L. Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics. University of California Press, 2005.
Sun, Y. “Corruption, Growth, and Reform: The Chinese Enigma.” CURRENT HISTORY-NEW YORK THEN PHILADELPHIA- 104, no. 683 (2005): 257.
Tangredi, S. J. Globalization and Maritime Power. Natl Defense Univ Pr, 2002.
Zhao, S. “China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?.” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2006): 131-144.
Zhao, T. “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’(Tian-xia,).” Social Identities 12, no. 1 (2006): 29-41.
[1] Cohen, East Asia at the Center.
[2] Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere.
[3] Tangredi, Globalization and Maritime Power.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Gomez and Xiao, Chinese Enterprise, Transnationalism, and Identity
[6] Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere.
[7] Gomez and Xiao, Chinese Enterprise, Transnationalism, and Identity.
[8] Shambaugh, Power Shift, chap. 2.
[9] Kang, “Hierarchy in Asian International Relations.”
[10] Zhao, “China's Pragmatic Nationalism.”
[11] Zhao, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’(Tian-xia,).”
[12] Cohen, East Asia at the Center.
[13] Bergsten, China, chap. 4.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Hawkins, How China Plans to Dominate the Shipbuilding Industry; Brooke, “Korea reigns in shipbuilding, for now.”
[16] Bergsten, China, chap. 4.
[17] Ibid., 56.
[18] Ibid., 57.
[19] Goh, “Is China Predisposed to Using Force? Confucian-Mencian and Sunzi Paradigms in Chinese Strategic Culture.”
[20] Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive.
[21] Bergsten, China, chap. 1.
[22] Sun, “Corruption, Growth, and Reform.”
[23] Cohen, East Asia at the Center, chap. 13.
[24] Shambaugh, Power Shift, chap. 2.
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